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Abstract: In this research note we document the decrease in victimisation rates during the 
COVID-19 lockdown period in New Zealand. We show that the changes in mobility patterns 
in the same period are significantly correlated with these changes in crime rates. We discuss 
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1 Introduction
On 29 December 2019, Chinese authorities notified the World Health Organisation of pneumonia
cases of unknown cause, originating in Wuhan, Hubei province.1 On 13 January 2020, the
first case outside China was confirmed, in Thailand, and by 28 February the first confirmed
case in New Zealand was reported. On 16 March, the New Zealand government banned some
gatherings of more than 500 people, followed by bans on indoor events of more than 100 people
on 19 March, and a closing of the border to most foreigners on 20 March. On 21 March, the
Alert system was introduced, starting at Level 2, which restricted the sizes of gatherings and
people allowed in a shared space, with an emphasis on social distancing and the ability to trace
people’s interactions.2 This was followed by the stricter Level 3 on 23 March, emphasising
mixing of related and small “bubbles” of people known to each other, and then total lockdown
for most people and most activities, or Level 4, by 26 March, lasting until 28 April with a return
to Level 3 and then the return to Level 2 on 14 May. This timeline of increased restrictions of
how many people could occupy a shared space and what activities they could do, represents, as
Stickle and Felson (2020) describe, the largest criminological experiment in history.
What travel and activity restrictions and concerns about catching COVID-19 led to was
a situation where most people spent a large fraction of their time at home, frequently in their
small family bubbles, with many commercial locations empty of people. The result were changes
in the opportunities and potential for different types of property crime and crimes against
people. Furthermore, the probability of being caught committing some forms of crimes by
the police could also have changed if police were focused on enforcing the social distancing,
travel, and activity restrictions, than enforcing some types of criminal behaviour. Given these
changes, natural questions are what did happen to criminal behaviour during this period and
what might the response of criminal behaviour be in New Zealand once the restrictions were
relaxed, especially in an economy potentially heading into a recession. In this paper we use
Police Victimisation and Google mobility data to provide a preliminary exploration of how
the lockdown potentially affected criminal behaviour in New Zealand and on the basis of this
speculate as to what we can expect to happen to criminal behaviour after it ended.
1For details of the timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic see https://nzdoctor.co.nz/timeline-coronavirus.




According to the literature on the economics of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlik, 1973), people choose
to offend weighing up the expected benefits against the expected costs of the offending. This
approach is supported by many empirical studies. For example, Machin and Meghir (2004) find
falls in (relative) wages of low-wage workers leads to higher crime rates. Draca, Kutmerides
and Machin (2019) find criminals respond rationally to changes in the value of goods. Metz
and Burdina (2018) find increases in neighbourhood income inequality leads to higher property
crime rates. Levitt (2004) and Levitt and Miles (2007) detail the deterrent impact of law
enforcement and criminal punishment as a whole on criminal offending. Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996) and Rotger (2019) find support for neighbourhood and peer effects, either
as constraining factors (e.g. family values or neighbourhood monitoring) or promoting factors
(e.g. greater social acceptability or knowledge how to commit crimes). For New Zealand, Papps
and Winkelmann (1985) find lower unemployment rates are associated with lower crime rates.
This theoretical framework and associated empirical findings is also consistent with criminal
justice theories (see for example, Cohen and Felson (1979) and Clarke and Cornish (1985)) that
offending rates depend on the presence or absence of likely offenders (i.e. people with fewer
positive returns from legal activities), suitable targets (i.e. the presence of high value premises
or people or goods), and the absence of suitable guardians (i.e. a lower probability of being
caught).
Since a COVID-19 lockdown can potentially affect both costs and benefits (or the convergence
of an offender, a target and an absence of a guardian), we could expect to see changes in criminal
offending. For some crimes, we would expect to see decreases, but for others we could expect
to see increases. For example, a lockdown results in much lower physical retail activity (fewer
outlets open, and less cash and stock on-hand at retail premises), thus reducing the expected
gains from theft from commercial premises. Furthermore, for a given level of policing, the chance
of being caught breaking into a commercial business increases given an offender will stand out
with so few other people around. The probability of being caught breaking into a residence would
increase significantly given most people are at home and would detect it. The expected gain
from time spent attempting to commit an aggravated robbery will likely fall as fewer people are
around. Since people no longer congregate at bars, nightclubs and the like, with an absence of
any non-material gain from a crime against a person, such as the psychic benefit from exerting
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dominance, we would expect to see less violence away from the home. On the other hand,
the expected benefit from trying to defraud people through cybercrimes could be expected to
increase if more people are online and engaging in online spending. An additional factor relates
to where police resources are devoted, the latter particularly true during a lockdown when police
would be enforcing travel and other restrictions. If police resources were devoted to monitoring
residential movement, this could have positive or negative effects on criminal offending. Jennings
and Perez (2020) detail how various restrictions on a population’s activities in the United States
during COVID-19 caused changes in policing behaviour, notably moving resources away from
dealing with “low-level” crimes.
What would past experience with epidemics and crime tell us about changes most likely to
happen in New Zealand in response to COVID-19? Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge
there are no studies of the relationship between previous epidemics and crime. Some studies
of the impact of COVID-19 on criminal activity, using synthetic controls based on data from
the most recent years, are slowly appearing but they are at best preliminary in their findings
and involve social and cultural settings different from New Zealand’s and different strategies
in dealing with the epidemic than New Zealand’s “go early, go hard” regiment. As a result,
it is difficult to generalise from them at this stage. What has been found tends to be the
following. Ashby (2020) in a study of crime in 16 large United States cities with various social
distancing and stay-at-home orders from mid-January to early May finds they are associated
with no change in assaults (public or residential), decreases in vehicle theft and residential
burglaries, and no change in non-residential burglary. Piquero et al (2020) find evidence of a
short-term transient spike in domestic violence from a stay-at-home order in Dallas. Mohler et
al (2020) find statistically significant impacts of social distancing on some crimes in Los Angeles
and Indianapolis, but with several differences between the two cities. Halford et al (2020) study
crime rates in Lancashire in the United Kingdom for March 2020 and find that all recorded
crime had fallen one week after lockdown. They also highlight that lags occur from a crime
being committed to reporting of the crime, and this is likely contaminating the results for at
least some forms of crime such as domestic abuse and online fraud. Payne, Morgan, and Piquero
(2020) find that common assault, serious assault, and sexual offending all fell significantly, the
latter two statistically significantly, in the month after social distancing regulations came into
effect in Queensland. Payne and Morgan (2020) study various offence rates for the Australian
state of Queensland during March 2020. While Queensland declared a public health emergency
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on 29 January, most restrictions on people’s lives did not occur until mid-March, thus measured
crime rates for the month might show little change from previous years. Even still, significantly
lower rates were reported for shop and other thefts, and credit-card fraud. Reported rates
of other crimes showed no statistical impact from the restrictions. Overall, the international
evidence strongly suggests that the lockdown in New Zealand will likely have changed crime
rates, but with uncertainty about how much each type of crime and location of the crime would
be affected.
3 Data and Results
The main dataset is monthly victimisation reports to New Zealand Police from July 2014 to May
2020 (inclusive).3 Variables of interest include the number of victims (victimisation), ANZSOC
(Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology) division that denotes the type of crime,
location, meshblock, month, and year. We group the 17 ANZSOC divisions into two broad
types: property crime and crime against the person. We also group the various locations into
two categories: residential and non-residential. We aggregate by type of crime and location over
the entire country. We use quarterly country population to compute a rate per 1000 people,
which allows us to better compare the data across time. We show these four time series in
Figure 1. Victimisation rates are fairly stable across all four broad categories from 2014 to
2018. Property crimes show noticeable spikes in January of 2017, 2018, and 2019 as would
be expected from studies on weather and crime rates (McDowall, Loftin, and Powell (2012);
Harp and Karnauskas (2018); and Horrocks and Mencolva (2017) for New Zealand). There is an
increasing trend in non-residential property crime rates throughout 2019. The lockdown starting
in March 2020 brings an obvious sharp decrease in victimisation rates across all four categories.
Table 1 reports the results of a simple regression model of victimisation rates against month
and year fixed effects. January and 2015 are the omitted month and year, respectively. The
lockdown indicator variable equals one in March, April, and May 2020, and zero otherwise. The
month fixed effects control for the seasonality of certain crimes, while the year fixed effects control
for broad changes in factors such as the macroeconomic environment or police resourcing.4 As the
3policedata.nz
4For example, New Zealand Police in their 2019 annual report state that constabulary numbers had increased




four columns show, the lockdown has a significantly negative effect on all four broad categories
of crime. Within each column, comparison between the lockdown coefficient and the constant
term gives us an idea on the magnitude of these decreases. Property crimes in non-residential
locations decrease by more than half. Property crimes in residential locations and crimes against
the person in non-residential locations decrease by about 30%. Crimes against the person in
residential locations decrease by about 42%. The month fixed effects also accord with findings
elsewhere that criminal offending tends to be highest over warmer months, for example December
through to March, with January also being the month where people tend to be on a summer
holiday with residential properties left unattended.
Table 1: Trends in victimisation rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of crime and location: Property Property Person Person
non-residential residential non-residential residential
lockdown -1.406*** -0.348*** -0.123*** -0.008**
Month fixed effects:
January — — — —
February -0.186* -0.138*** -0.005 -0.002
March 0.086 -0.085** 0.030** -0.002
April -0.318*** -0.155*** -0.073*** -0.007***
May -0.148 -0.069** -0.021* -0.007***
June -0.203* -0.113*** -0.038*** -0.007***
July -0.138 -0.090*** -0.051*** -0.007***
August -0.083 -0.063* -0.019 -0.005**
September -0.165 -0.083** -0.022* -0.004*
October -0.080 -0.059* -0.008 -0.002
November -0.037 -0.060* 0.031** 0.001
December -0.073 -0.051 0.038*** 0.004
Year fixed effects:
2014 -0.146 -0.041 0.003 -0.003
2015 — — — —
2016 0.024 0.105*** 0.014 0.002
2017 -0.005 0.103*** 0.016* 0.010***
2018 -0.074 0.010 0.005 0.016***
2019 0.147* 0.034 0.020** 0.018***
2020 0.657*** 0.133*** 0.042** 0.032***
constant 2.477*** 1.096*** 0.401*** 0.019***
N 71 71 71 71
R2 .66647 .76418 .83781 .89962
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
probability of being detected committing a crime would have increased over this period. https://www.police.
govt.nz/about-us/publications/corporate/annual-report
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According to the routine activity theory in criminology, crime rates are determined by the
combination of likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians. The
lockdown is likely to have a negative effect on the first two for certain categories of crime. From
the perspective of the economic theory of crime, the lockdown is likely to decrease the expected
benefit of certain categories of crime as, for example, fewer retail and other premises are open
for shoplifting or theft to occur and fewer motor vehicles are left unattended for large periods of
time to be stolen. We test these theories by regressing the changes in victimisation rate on the
changes in mobility. As Figure 2 shows, the lockdown brings drastic changes to people’s mobility
patterns, with a sharp decrease in most retail premises, including grocery stores and pharmacies,
and a sharp increase in residential locations. The mobility time series across different regions
are extremely similar. For this regression, we aggregate the victimisation data to the territorial
authority level. (There are 66 territorial authorities in our dataset.) We then compute the
year-on-year change in victimisation per 1000. We aggregate the mobility data from Google5 to
the monthly level, and merge it with the victimisation data.
Table 2: Effect of mobility on victimisation rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of crime and location: Property Property Person Person
non-residential residential non-residential residential
Percentage change in mobility in:
Grocery/Pharmacy 0.001 -0.003 0.007** -0.001
Residential -0.050*** -0.015** 0.006 -0.001
constant 0.446*** 0.105** -0.053** 0.014*
N 211 211 211 211
R2 .43839 .14585 .07878 .00523
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
These regressions show that changes in mobility do have significant effects on some categories
of crime. An increase in mobility in residential areas is significantly correlated with a decrease
in the rate of property crime, in both residential and non-residential locations. A decrease in
mobility in the grocery store and pharmacy is significantly correlated with a decrease in the rate
of crime against the person in non-residential locations. However, the rate of crime against the






While our analysis of the impact of lockdown on criminal behaviour is at an early stage, our
results are suggestive that the lockdown did significantly impact reported crime rates in New
Zealand. The lockdown is associated with falls in the rate of non-residential property crime by 1.4
crimes per 1,000 people (about a 50% fall), of residential property crime by 0.368 crimes per 1,000
people (about a 30% fall) and of crimes against a person in a non-residential setting of 0.123 per
1,000 people (about a 30% fall). At the population level, these imply large falls in the absolute
numbers of crimes. The falls are not only statistically significant but economically significant.
The rate for crimes against a person in residential settings saw a statistically significant fall,
and was relatively large in magnitude. But, we are suspicious about this value for two reasons.
First, it will include domestic violence (referred to by New Zealand Police as family harm) and,
as discussed earlier, there is international evidence is that domestic violence rates increased
with lockdown type restrictions. Second, domestic violence cases are also well know for being
under-reported and reported with delays, and thus the decrease might just be the result of
measurement issues.
Our (preliminary) results accord with the theories of crime in economics and in criminology.
The lockdown significantly changed where people were located and what they could do, and
led to drastic changes in types and extent of economic activities by businesses. The Google
mobility data clearly highlight this fact and the regression results suggest that these changes led
to changes in criminal offending. Most commercial activities were shut, most motor vehicles were
no longer left unattended while people were at work, and non-residential recreational activities
did not occur. The expected monetary or psychic benefits from committing many forms of
crimes fell without shops to shoplift from, motor vehicles to steal, people to rob or assault. In
the criminology literature this would equate to a lack of suitable targets. Equally, the expected
costs from committing many forms of crime would increase as offenders would stand out with a
lack of people in non-residential locations and residential crimes would be more easily detected
with most people at home during almost all of the day. In the criminology literature this would
be the presence of guardians. Put these together, an substantial decrease in committing many
forms of crimes and a substantial increase in their expected costs, it is not surprising that the
overall numbers and rates of reported criminal offending fell. But these (suggestive) findings
raise what we think are interesting questions. For example, what happened once the lockdown
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ceased, did crime rates increase to previous levels and if so, how long did it take to do so? Given
that the lockdown led to falls in crime rates, we would expect increases once the lockdown ended.
What we do not know is if it returned to a similar level, or if there was pressure to make up for
“missed crime opportunities”, in which case crime rates would be higher still, or if there was
a “learning effect” and less criminal behaviour will lead to a continuation of lower crime rates.
Were the falls uniform across geographic types (e.g. urban versus rural) or socio-demographic
groupings (e.g. low versus high income groups)? What did happen to domestic violence during
the lockdown period? Our next step is to answer these sorts of questions as well as carrying out
more robustness checks of our preliminary results.
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